Panchkula plot re-allotment (AJL/National Herald): Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya’s 44-page judgment dated 25 February 2026 reminds investigators they cannot play court.
By KBS Sidhu*
February 25
When Investigators Redetermine “Public Interest” in Hindsight
The Punjab & Haryana High Court has, in a significant order delivered today, 25 February 2026, quashed the CBI chargesheet and the trial court’s charges against former Haryana Chief Minister Bhupinder Singh Hooda and The Associated Journals Limited (AJL) in the Panchkula institutional-plot case linked to the National Herald group. The verdict—running into a 44-page judgment—was authored by Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya.
At one level, the case concerns a familiar genre of Indian litigation: an allotment made, cancelled, sought to be restored, restored, and then criminalised years later. Yet at another level, Justice Dahiya’s judgment reads like a carefully calibrated institutional warning: investigative agencies are not courts, and criminal law cannot be made to do the work of administrative review merely because politics makes a dispute tempting.
The dispute, stripped to essentials
The plot in question was originally allotted to AJL decades ago for an office connected with publication activity. The allotment was later cancelled and the plot resumed for non-construction. After Bhupinder Singh Hooda became Chief Minister and, by virtue of office, Chairman of the development authority, a decision was taken in 2005 to restore/re-allot the plot on terms that required payment of the re-allotment price and related fees. AJL paid the demanded amounts, construction was eventually raised, and the authority later issued the occupation certificate. Importantly, the decision was later ratified ex post facto by the authority.
The criminal case—originating as a vigilance enquiry and later transferred to the CBI—essentially attempted to convert this administrative sequence into a prosecution for conspiracy, cheating, and “criminal misconduct” under the Prevention of Corruption law.
What the High Court found troubling about the CBI’s theory
Justice Dahiya’s reasoning is notable for what it refuses to do. It refuses to treat a disputed administrative decision as inherently criminal simply because an investigating agency characterises it that way. The judgment underscores that the re-allotment remained valid and implemented, was ratified, and was never set aside by any competent forum. In that backdrop, the Court’s message is stark: an agency cannot assume the role of a tribunal, declare a decision unlawful on its own, and then build criminal liability on that self-made foundation.
This is the pivotal distinction the judgment reinforces—an allegedly wrong decision is not automatically a dishonest decision.
The missing ingredients: conspiracy, cheating, and “loss”
On conspiracy, the High Court noted the absence of credible material showing an agreement or “meeting of minds” between AJL and Hooda to execute an illegal plan. On cheating, the Court returned to first principles: there must be deception and dishonest inducement leading to wrongful loss or gain. Here, AJL paid what was demanded; the evidence did not show a calculated inducement or deception that caused actual loss.
The most damaging weakness, however, lay in the prosecution’s claims about “loss” to the authority and “gain” to AJL. The judgment rejects speculative arithmetic and after-the-fact valuation shortcuts. It is not enough for witnesses to say “current rates would have fetched more”; a criminal charge needs some reliable footing to show what the contemporaneous value actually was, and whether the decision caused a demonstrable financial injury. Without that, “loss” becomes an allegation floating in the air—politically useful perhaps, but legally weightless.
A pointed note on selectivity
There is another institutional point, made without theatricality but with clear implication. The restoration decision was ratified by the authority, yet the prosecution focused on Hooda while leaving aside other participants in the ratification. That kind of selectivity, the Court observed, raises questions about the nature and bona fides of the investigation. In an era when investigative credibility is fragile, such judicial observations carry consequences far beyond one case file.
The wider shadow of the old “public interest” clause
The case also reminds us why the now-removed language of the Prevention of Corruption law—particularly the former clause that spoke of obtaining advantage “without any public interest”—was always vulnerable to misuse. “Public interest” is a broad, contestable concept. In governance, it is a standard; in criminal law, it can become a trap, inviting prosecution driven by hindsight and ideology rather than evidence of dishonest intent. The reform impulse behind narrowing this space was to protect decision-making from paralysis while keeping the statute sharp against actual bribery and illicit enrichment.
Justice Dahiya’s approach reflects that sensibility. Even where the judgment notes that Hooda may have ignored some advice or official noting, it does not automatically convert that into a crime. Poor judgment, disregard of a note, or an arguable procedural departure may be grounds for administrative scrutiny. Criminal liability, however, demands something more: dishonest intention supported by material, not conjecture supported by controversy.
KBS Sidhu, IAS (retd.), served as Special Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab. He is the Editor-in-Chief of The KBS Chronicle, a daily newsletter offering independent commentary on governance, public policy, hi-tech and strategic affairs.
\