Bombay HC Sentences Tarun Tejpal To 10 Years In Jail And Fine Of More Than Rs 10 Lakh In A 2013 Sexual Assault Case
Courtesy :Special Report by Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,Meerut
In a major setback to former Tehelka magazine editor – Tarun Tejpal, we see that the Goa Bench of Bombay High Court at Panaji in a most recent judgment titled State of Goa vs Tarunjit Tejpal & Anr in Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 2022 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:BHC-GOA:1562-DB that was reserved on 30 July 2026 and then pronounced just recently on August 6, 2026 has sentenced former Tehelka editor Tarun Tejpal to ten years in jail in a 2013 sexual assault case. It must be mentioned here that a Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble Dr Justice Neela Gokhale and Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Jamsandekar who authored this latest judgment has also imposed a fine of more than Rs 10 lakh on Tejpal. We need to note that the Court also took into account the mitigating factors before pronouncing the judgment.
It was held by the Court that, “The incident took place 13 years ago. There is no report of misconduct or allegation. Both parties must have moved on in life.” He was granted two weeks to surrender before the jail authorities. It may be recalled that the Court pronounced the sentence on an appeal that had been filed by the State of Goa in 2022. The High Court had earlier overturned his acquittal by the Trial Court and found him guilty of rape and sexual harassment under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
At the very outset, this brief judgment authored by Hon’ble Dr Justice Neela Gokhale for a Division Bench of the Goa Bench of Bombay High Court for herself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Jamsandekar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This Appeal assails the Judgment and Order dated 21st May, 2021, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge at Mapusa in Sessions Case (Ors.) No. 10/ 2014, acquitting the Respondent herein (Original Accused) of offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f), 376(2)(k), 354, 354A, 354B, 341 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’).”
As we see, the Division Bench then observes in para 2 that, “By a reasoned Order dated 23rd April 2022, this Court opined that a prima facie case is made out and that arguable issues are raised by the Appellant-State of Goa, thereby necessitating deeper scrutiny and re-appreciation/reconsideration of the evidence to ascertain the correctness and legality of the Judgment and Order impugned herein. Hence, this Court allowed the Leave to Appeal Application and admitted the Appeal.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench then envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the facts of the case that, “Factual Overview & Allegations:
3.1. The Respondent was the Editor-in-Chief and owner of ‘Tehelka’ magazine. The victim was employed by the Respondent at Tehelka, initially as an intern, then as a trainee journalist, and later as a correspondent and a senior correspondent. At the relevant time, she held the designation of Principal Correspondent and worked in Tehelka’s Mumbai office.
3.2. Tehelka started a festival called ‘THiNK Fest’ in 2011 and continued to organise it annually in Goa. The victim was stated to be part of all three editions, in various capacities, as an employee of Tehelka.
3.3. At THiNK Fest – 2013, the victim was responsible for attending to and chaperoning the festival's Chief Guest, Mr Robert De Niro, a Hollywood actor. The festival was held from 07th November 2013 to 11th November 2013 at Grand Hyatt in Bambolim, Goa.
The Incidents/Allegations
3.4. November 7, 2013 (approx. 10:20 p.m.): The victim’s allegations against the Respondent are that, on 7th November 2013, at around 10.20 p.m., the Respondent and the victim accompanied Mr De Niro to his room on the 2nd Floor of Block No. 7 of the hotel. After dropping Mr De Niro at his room, as the Respondent and the victim were leaving the lobby, the Respondent instructed her to accompany him back to Mr De Niro’s room to wake him up. The victim complied with his instruction, as he was her boss. Inside the lift, the Respondent sexually assaulted her, ignoring her pleas to stop. He manipulated the lift control panel to keep the doors closed. Later that night (approx. 1:30 a.m.), he sent her a text message on her phone reading “the finger tips”.
3.5. November 8, 2013: Under the pretext of retrieving an item for Mr De Niro, the Respondent again ordered the victim to accompany him in the elevator, during which he committed a second sexual assault.
Investigative & Procedural Timeline
3.6. On 21st November 2013, news of the Respondent’s alleged sexual assault on a female journalist of Tehelka was published across various social media sites and electronic media channels. The victim had also sent an e-mail dated 18th November 2013 (Exhibit 733(1)) to Ms Suparna Chaudhury, alias Shoma Chaudhury, Managing Editor of Tehelka (PW-45), narrating the entire incident.
3.7. Shamina Shafiq (PW-38), a member of the National Commission for Women (‘NCW’), on its behalf, took suo motu cognizance of the media reports regarding the alleged sexual assault charge made by the victim against the Respondent and addressed a letter dated 22nd November 2013 (Exhibit 547) to the Director General of Police, Goa, requesting the registration of an FIR in the matter.
3.8. On the basis of the news regarding the sexual assault allegation made by the victim against the Respondent, Ms Sunita Sawant, PI, CID-Crime Branch, Dona Paula (PW-70), the Investigating Officer (‘IO’), lodged a complaint, pursuant to which FIR No. 27/2013 dated 22nd November 2013 was registered against the Respondent at the CID CB Police Station, North Goa (Exhibit C-3), for offences punishable under Sections 354A, 376, and 376(2)(k) of the IPC.
3.9. Based on the investigation recorded in the FIR, the IO addressed a letter dated 02nd December 2013 to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panaji, Goa (‘JMFC’), seeking the addition of offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 376(2) (f) and 376-C of the IPC against the Respondent. Another letter dated 27th January 2014 was also addressed to the JMFC, Panaji, Goa, seeking the addition of an offence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC.
3.10. The offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(k) and 354A of the IPC are exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Accordingly, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panaji, Goa, by Committal Order dated 21st February 2014(Exhibit C-1), committed the case to the Sessions Court for trial.
3.11. By an Order dated 07th September 2017, the Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa, Goa, framed charges against the Respondent (Exhibit 231-C) for offences punishable under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(k), 341 and 342 of the IPC. After the charges were framed, the Respondent pleaded not guilty and sought to be tried.
3.13. The Respondent’s statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) was recorded. The Respondent’s defence is one of false implication. The Additional Sessions Judge at Mapusa, by its Judgment and Order dated 21st May 2021, acquitted the Respondent of all the offences charged against him. Aggrieved by the acquittal, the State of Goa has preferred the present Appeal. By order dated 23rd April 2022, the application seeking Leave to Appeal was allowed, and the Appeal was admitted. The records and proceedings were called for and received.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 54 that, “We have carefully perused the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the Trial Court, acquitting the Respondent. The Trial Court’s findings are directly contrary to the evidence on record and thus per se perverse. The Trial Court’s evaluation of the victim’s testimony and evidence exhibits multiple fatal flaws, largely stemming from preconceived notions and reliance on irrelevant or inadmissible material. Furthermore, the Court misconstrued the disclosures made to her colleagues (PW-11, PW-12, PW-56) and mother (PW-53) as suspect or failing to corroborate rape, completely ignoring that she confided in close friends and family without intending them to be formal disclosure statements. The Trial Court similarly misread her inability to open a seven-year-old e-mail account on court hardware after surrendering her phone to the police as a sign of untrustworthiness, and drew unfounded negative inferences regarding her lack of visible physical injuries, her physical response, or her failure to lower her chin to avoid being forcibly kissed or to scratch her attacker. In doing so, the Court relied on stereotypical assumptions about how an “ideal” victim should physically resist or emotionally react, going so far as to hold her smiling demeanour during subsequent work events against her.”
It is also worth noting that the Division Bench notes in para 55 that, “The Trial Court has also erred in observing that there was no whisper of admission of sexual assault or any of its attributes in the apology e-mails. The apology e-mails, in fact, clearly relate to an ‘encounter’, ‘sexual liaison’ and ‘furtive acts’, in respect of which the Respondent issued two apologies- one formal and the other personal. Without any substantive material, the Trial Court has believed the apologies to be given under pressure. Additionally, the Trial Court misapplied legal principles and misread key evidence to favour the defence. It wrongly disregarded the clear admissions of guilt in the Respondent’s apology e-mails, misclassifying them as unprompted disclosure statements under Section 27 of the IEA or assuming they were sent under pressure, while relying on hearsay testimony (PW-36) and improperly weighing defence witnesses (DW-1, DW-4) over consistent prosecution witnesses.”
It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench hastens to add in para 56 noting that, “Factually, it erred by stating her oral testimony lacked CCTV support. Most glaringly, the Court permitted an invasive, humiliating cross-examination into the victim’s past sexual history, moral views, and personal WhatsApp messages, directly violating statutory embargoes under the IEA that prohibit questioning a victim’s character or past relationships. The Trial Court appears to be influenced by extraneous, inadmissible material and testimony, including graphic details of the victim’s past sexual history, which are prohibited by law, and used them to censure her character and discredit her evidence.”
It also merits noting that the Division Bench notes in para 57 that, “Rather than evaluating the sterling case presented by the prosecution with the requisite judicial sobriety, the Trial Court resorted to hyper-technicalities, ignored binding Supreme Court guidelines on assessing sexual assault evidence, and unjustifiably granted the benefit of the doubt to the Respondent where none reasonably existed.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Division Bench points out in para 58 that, “The Court incorrectly drew adverse inferences from the victim consulting an NGO and legal counsel, treating it as potential fabrication, and treated minor discrepancies in her deposition— recorded five years after the incident—as material contradictions, rather than applying established Supreme Court precedents, such as Gurmit Singh (supra at pg. 19), which state that minor omissions do not invalidate an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The Trial Court failed to appreciate that the victim, a young professional woman, was pitted against the might of the Respondent and his organisation. She was entitled to seek legal advice before charting the course of action. Seeking professional help is termed by the Trial Court as a possibility of doctoring of events or adding of incidents. This finding of the Trial Court is flawed.”
It also cannot be just glossed over that the Division Bench holds in para 59 that, “The Trial Court has also erred in discrediting the victim’s testimony on the ground that she evaded answering whether she lifted her legs at any point; failing to clarify in this regard in the attachment to the e-mail dated 16th November 2013 sent to PW-11 and in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC, thus treating this as an improvement in her evidence and a material contradiction. The Trial Court also considered her testimony as unreliable as the victim did not claim that the Respondent touched her shoulders or any other part of her body, while stating in her chief-examination that he touched her mouth while kissing, legs and vagina while disrobing and inserting his tongue and fingers. The Trial Court also discarded the victim’s testimony of the Respondent kissing her forcibly and putting his tongue in her vagina as she did not record this in her summary of recollection. The Trial Court construed this as an improvement in the statement, making it unreliable.”
Most significantly, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 60 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Considering the aforesaid discussion, we find that the victim has made truthful statements, and the prosecution has established the case against the Respondent beyond every reasonable doubt. The Trial Court fell in error in acquitting the Respondent of the charges leveled against him. The appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court is not only unreasonable but perverse. The conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court are untenable and, in the established facts and circumstances of the case, the view expressed by it is not a possible view.”
Equally significant is that the Division Bench then directs and holds in para 61 that, “We, accordingly, set aside the Judgment and Order of the Trial Court and convict the Respondent for offences punishable under Section 376(2)(f) and (k), 354, 354A, 354B 341 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.”
Most remarkably, the Division Bench propounds in para 67 holding that, “We considered the arguments of both the learned Counsels and the Respondent in person. Sexual harassment at work causes significant and enduring harm to women’s career paths, punishing them for factors outside their control. Additionally, a widespread culture of victim blaming and institutional resistance isolates survivors, prompting them to switch jobs or accept demotions. An insensitive and unresponsive work environment often instills fear in women about venturing out of their homes to pursue meaningful opportunities, thereby preventing them from fully utilizing their talents and skills. The victim in the present matter also suffered similar consequences. She was compelled to resign. She also suffered profound embarrassment during trial.”
In conclusion, we thus see that the Bombay High Court has accepted the contention of the Solicitor General as stated in para 66 that, “Mr. Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, on behalf of the State, submitted that the Court should factor in that the Respondent was a parent figure to the victim. The Respondent knew the victim’s father. The victim was the same age as the Respondent’s daughter. Further, the Court should also consider the fact that the Respondent repeated the offence the very next day and thus had no remorse. He submitted that when a woman says ‘No’, it means ‘No’; that should have been understood by the Respondent, he being of the age of the victim’s father.” This is undoubtedly a very big setback for Tarun Tejpal but he still has the option to approach the Supreme Court as pointed out in para 64 of this pertinent judgment through his lawyer who is senior and eminent advocate – Aabad Ponda stating that, “Mr. Ponda further submitted that the Respondent intends to assail the present Judgment and Order before the Supreme Court and in view thereof the Respondent be given a period of 8 weeks from today to surrender.” It thus definitely merits just no reiteration that we have to keep our fingers crossed on the final outcome until it is decided finally by the Apex Court!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi,
A - 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.